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<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head profile="http://www.w3.org/2000/08/w3c-synd/#"><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
<title>XML Key Management Specification (XKMS 2.0) Bindings</title>
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<body xml:lang="EN-US" lang="EN-US">
<div class="head">
<a href="http://www.w3.org/" shape="rect"><img src="http://www.w3.org/Icons/w3c_home" alt="W3C" height="48" width="72" /></a>
<h1 class="NoNumber" id="title"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_1" shape="rect" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_1">XML Key
Management Specification (XKMS 2.0) Bindings</a></h1>
<h2 class="NoNumber" id="version"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_2" shape="rect" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_2">Version
2.0</a></h2>
<h2 class="NoNumber" id="W3C-doctype"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_3" shape="rect" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_3"></a><a name="Masthead" id="Masthead" shape="rect">W3C Recommendation 28 June 2005</a></h2>
<dl>
<dt>This version:</dt>
<dd><a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2005/REC-xkms2-bindings-20050628/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/2005/REC-xkms2-bindings-20050628/</a></dd>
<dt>Latest version:</dt>
<dd><a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xkms2-bindings/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/xkms2-bindings/</a></dd>
<dt>Previous version:</dt>
<dd><a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2005/PR-xkms2-bindings-20050502/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/2005/PR-xkms2-bindings-20050502/</a> </dd>
<dt>Editors:</dt>
<dd>Phillip Hallam-Baker, Verisign</dd>
<dd>Shivaram H. Mysore</dd>
<dt>Contributors:</dt>
<dd>See the <a href="#Acknowledgments" shape="rect">Acknowledgments</a>.</dd>
</dl>
<p>Please refer to the <a
href="http://www.w3.org/2005/06/xkms2-errata.html"><strong>errata</strong></a>
for this document, which may include some normative corrections.</p>
<p>See also <a href="http://www.w3.org/2003/03/Translations/byTechnology?technology=xkms2-bindings"><strong>translations</strong></a>.</p>
<p class="copyright"><a href="http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/ipr-notice#Copyright"> Copyright</a> ©2005 <a href="http://www.w3.org/"><acronym title="World Wide Web Consortium">W3C</acronym></a><sup>®</sup> (<a href="http://www.csail.mit.edu/"><acronym title="Massachusetts Institute of Technology">MIT</acronym></a>, <a href="http://www.ercim.org/"><acronym title="European Research Consortium for Informatics and Mathematics">ERCIM</acronym></a>, <a href="http://www.keio.ac.jp/">Keio</a>), All Rights Reserved. W3C <a href="http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/ipr-notice#Legal_Disclaimer">liability</a>, <a href="http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/ipr-notice#W3C_Trademarks">trademark</a> and <a href="http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/copyright-documents">document use</a> rules apply.</p>
</div>
<hr title="Separator from Header" />
<div>
<h2 class="Abstract"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_4" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_4" shape="rect"></a><a id="abstract" name="abstract" shape="rect">Abstract</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_2" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_2"
class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[2]</a>This document specifies
protocol bindings with security characteristics for the <a
href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2005/REC-xkms2-20050628/" shape="rect">XML
Key Management Specification (XKMS</a>).</p>
<h2 class="NoNumber"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_5" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_5" shape="rect"></a><a name="status" id="status" shape="rect">Status of
this document</a></h2>
<p><em>This section describes the status of this document at the time of its
publication. Other documents may supersede this document. A list of current
W3C publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be
found in the <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/">W3C technical reports index</a>
at http://www.w3.org/TR/.</em></p>
<p>This document is a <a href="/2003/06/Process-20030618/tr.html#RecsW3C">W3C
Recommendation</a>. It has been reviewed by W3C Members and other interested
parties and has been endorsed by the Director. It is a stable document and
may be used as reference material or cited as a normative reference from
another document. W3C's role in making the Recommendation is to draw
attention to the specification and to promote its widespread deployment. This
enhances the functionality and interoperability of the Web.</p>
<p>This document has been produced by the <a
href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS/" shape="rect">XKMS Working
Group</a> (WG). The English version of this specification is the only
normative version. <a
href="http://www.w3.org/2003/03/Translations/byTechnology?technology=xkms2-bindings">
Translations</a> of this document may be available.</p>
<p>If you have any comments on this document, send them to <a
href="mailto:www-xkms@w3.org" shape="rect">www-xkms@w3.org</a>, a
mailing list with a <a
href="http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/www-xkms/"
shape="rect">public archive</a>. An <a
href="http://www.w3.org/2005/06/xkms2-errata">errata list</a> for this
edition is available.</p>
<p>This is Part 2 of the W3C Recommendation for the XML Key
Management Specification (XKMS Version 2.0). This document covers
different protocol bindings with security characteristics for the XML
Key Management Specification. <a
href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2005/REC-xkms2-20050628/ ">Part 1</a> of
this specification covers the XKMS protocols and services. For
background on this work, please see the <a
href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS/Activity" shape="rect">XKMS Activity
Statement</a>.</p>
<p>This document is based on the <a
href="/TR/2005/PR-xkms2-bindings-20050502/">XKMS Version 2.0 Bindings
Proposed Recommendation</a> of 2 May 2005. <a
href="/2001/XKMS/Drafts/pr-issues/issues.html">Feedback</a> received during
that review resulted in minor editorial changes. Evidence of interoperation
between at least two implementations of this specification are documented in
the <a
href="/2001/XKMS/Drafts/test-suite/CR-XKMS-Summary.html">Implementation
Report</a>. Changes to this document since the Proposed Recommendation
version are detailed in <a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_C">Appendix
C</a>.</p>
<p>This document was produced under the <a
href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/NOTE-patent-practice-20020124">24
January 2002 CPP</a> as amended by the <a
href="http://www.w3.org/2004/02/05-pp-transition">W3C Patent Policy
Transition Procedure</a>. The Working Group maintains a <a
rel="disclosure"
href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS/Disclosures.html">public list of
patent disclosures</a> relevant to this document; that page also
includes instructions for disclosing a patent. An individual who has
actual knowledge of a patent which the individual believes contains
Essential Claim(s) with respect to this specification should disclose
the information in accordance with <a
href="http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/#sec-Disclosure">section
6 of the W3C Patent Policy</a>.</p>
<hr title="Separator from Header" />
</div>
<!-- *************************** -->
<!-- TABLE OF CONTENTS -->
<!-- *************************** -->
<div class="contents">
<h2 class="no-toc" id="toc"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_6" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_Marker_6" shape="rect"></a><a name="TableOfContents" id="TableOfContents" shape="rect">Table of Contents</a></h2>
<ul class="toc">
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_1" shape="rect">1 Introduction</a>
<ul class="toc">
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_1_1" shape="rect">1.1 Editorial and Conformance
Conventions</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_1_2" shape="rect">1.2 Definition of
Terms</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_1_3" shape="rect">1.3 Structure of this
document</a></li>
</ul></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_2" shape="rect">2 Security Requirements</a>
<ul class="toc">
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_2_1" shape="rect">2.1 Confidentiality</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_2_2" shape="rect">2.2 Request
Authentication</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_2_3" shape="rect">2.3 Response
Authentication</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_2_4" shape="rect">2.4 Persistent
Authentication</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_2_5" shape="rect">2.5 Message Correlation
(Response Replay and Request Substitution)</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_2_6" shape="rect">2.6 Request Replay</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_2_7" shape="rect">2.7 Denial of Service</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_2_8" shape="rect">2.8 Security Requirements
Summary</a></li>
</ul></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_3" shape="rect">3 SOAP Binding</a>
<ul class="toc">
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_3_1" shape="rect">3.1 XKMS SOAP Message
Binding</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_3_2" shape="rect">3.2 Namespace
inclusions</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_3_3" shape="rect">3.3 Computation of XML
Signature Elements in XKMS Messages</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_3_4" shape="rect">3.4 Use of SOAP Faults</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_3_5" shape="rect">3.5 SOAP over HTTP
binding</a></li>
</ul></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_4" shape="rect">4 Security Bindings</a>
<ul class="toc">
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_4_1" shape="rect">4.1 Payload Authentication
Binding</a></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_4_2" shape="rect">4.2 Secure Socket Layer and
Transaction Layer (SSL/TLS)Security Binding</a></li>
</ul></li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_A" shape="rect">Appendix A
References</a> (Non-Normative)</li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_B" shape="rect">Appendix B Acknowledgments</a> (Non-Normative)</li>
<li class="tocline"><a href="#XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_C" shape="rect">Appendix C
Changes</a> (Non-Normative)</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h1><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_1" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_1" shape="rect">1</a> <a name="Introduction" id="Introduction" shape="rect">Introduction</a></h1>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_1_1" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_1_1" shape="rect">1.1</a> <a name="sec-Editorial" id="sec-Editorial" shape="rect">Editorial</a> and Conformance
Conventions</h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_8" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_8" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[8]</a>This specification uses XML Schemas [<a href="#XML-Schema1" shape="rect">XML-schema</a>] to describe the content model.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_9" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_9" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[9]</a>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this specification are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="#ref-KEYWORDS" shape="rect">RFC2119</a>]:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_10" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_10" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[10]</a>"they MUST only be used where it is actually
required for interoperation or to limit behavior which has potential for
causing harm (e.g., limiting retransmissions)"</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_11" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_11" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[11]</a>Consequently, we use these capitalized keywords
to unambiguously specify requirements over protocol and application features
and behavior that affect the interoperability and security of
implementations. These key words are not used (capitalized) to describe XML
grammar; schema definitions unambiguously describe such requirements and we
wish to reserve the prominence of these terms for the natural language
descriptions of protocols and features. For instance, an XML attribute might
be described as being "optional." Compliance with the XML-namespace
specification [<a href="#ref-XML-NS" shape="rect">XML-NS</a>] is described as
"REQUIRED."</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_1_2" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_1_2" shape="rect">1.2</a> <a name="DefinitionofTerms" id="DefinitionofTerms" shape="rect">Definition of Terms</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_14" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_14" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[14]</a>This document uses the terms defined in <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2005/REC-xkms2-20050628/#DefinitionofTerms" shape="rect">Section 1.2</a> of part
one of this specification in the manner described therein.</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_1_3" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_1_3" shape="rect">1.3</a> <a name="Structureofthisdocument" id="Structureofthisdocument" shape="rect">Structure of this
document</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_15" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_15" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[15]</a>The remainder of this document describes the
XML Key Information Service Specification and XML Key Registration Service
Specification.</p>
<dl>
<dt><b>Section 2</b>: Security Requirements</dt>
<dd>The security requirements of the XKMS protocol are specified.</dd>
<dt>Section 3: Payload Security Protocol</dt>
<dd>The security properties supported by the XKMS payload security
features are described.</dd>
<dt>Section 4: Security Bindings</dt>
<dd>The use of XKMS payload security features is described in the context
of specific security protocols.</dd>
<dt>Section 5: Security Considerations</dt>
<dd>Security considerations relevant to the implementation and deployment
of the specification are discussed.</dd>
</dl>
<h1><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_2" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_2" shape="rect">2</a> <a name="SecurityRequirements" id="SecurityRequirements" shape="rect">Security
Requirements</a></h1>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_16" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_16" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[16]</a>Security enhancements MAY be required to
control the following risks:</p>
<ul>
<li>Confidentiality</li>
<li>Request Authentication</li>
<li>Response Authentication</li>
<li>Persistent Authentication</li>
<li>Response Replay</li>
<li>Request Substitution</li>
<li>Request Replay</li>
<li>Denial of Service</li>
</ul>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_17" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_17" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[17]</a>The security enhancements required varies
according to the application. In the case of a free or un-metered service the
service may not require authentication of the request. A responder that
requires an authenticated request must know in that circumstance that the
request corresponds to the specified response.</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_1" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_1" shape="rect">2.1</a> <a name="Confidentiality" id="Confidentiality" shape="rect">Confidentiality</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_18" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_18" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[18]</a>Message confidentiality protects protocol
messages from disclosure to third parties. Confidentiality MAY be a
requirement for an XKMS service. Deployments SHOULD consider the extent to
which the content of XKMS messages reveal sensitive information. A
confidentiality requirement MAY exist even if a service only provides
information from public sources as the contents of a request might disclose
information about the client.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_19" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_19" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[19]</a>The use of transport or payload confidentiality
protection is NOT a substitute for the encryption of private keys specified
in the XKRSS Registration and Recovery services. A service that supports
registration of server generated keys or Key Recovery MUST implement the use
of XML Encryption with a strong cipher.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_20" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_20" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[20]</a>An XKMS service SHOULD support Confidentiality
by means of encryption.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_21" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_21" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[21]</a>The means by which the client determines that
the encryption key of the service is trustworthy is outside the scope of this
specification. Possible mechanisms include:</p>
<ul type="disc">
<li>A root key embedded in the client application</li>
<li>A signing key obtained using some other retrieval mechanism such as
PKIX [<a href="#RFC3280" shape="rect">RFC3280</a>] or SPKI [<a href="#RFC2693" shape="rect">RFC2693</a>].</li>
</ul>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_22" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_22" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[22]</a>An XKMS service MAY determine the
trustworthiness of an encryption key by reference to another XKMS service
provided that the chain of references is eventually grounded by a mechanism
that establishes direct trust between the client and the service.</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_2" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_2" shape="rect">2.2</a> <a name="RequestAuthentication" id="RequestAuthentication" shape="rect">Request
Authentication</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_23" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_23" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[23]</a>Request Message Authentication MAY be required.
An XKMS Service MAY require request authentication in deployments where the
XKMS service is restricted to a specific audience, possibly as a paid
service. An XKMS Service MAY require request authentication in contexts where
different levels of service are supported according to the identity of the
requestor.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_24" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_24" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[24]</a>In addition various forms of Authentication MAY
be required in the XKRSS Registration protocol to confirm the credentials of
the party initiating the request and their possession of the private key
component of the key pair(s) being registered.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_25" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_25" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[25]</a>An XKMS service SHOULD support Message Request
Authentication.</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_3" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_3" shape="rect">2.3</a> <a name="ResponseAuthentication" id="ResponseAuthentication" shape="rect">Response
Authentication</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_26" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_26" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[26]</a>Message Response Authentication MAY be
required. Message Response Authentication is required in any deployment of a
Validate service. A Locate service that provides only data that is
self-authenticating such as X.509 or PGP certificates does not require
Message Response Authentication.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_27" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_27" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[27]</a>Note that Message Response Authentication is
considered separately from Response Replay Protection.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_28" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_28" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[28]</a>An XKMS service SHOULD support Request
Authentication.</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_4" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_4" shape="rect">2.4</a> <a name="PersistentAuthentication" id="PersistentAuthentication" shape="rect">Persistent
Authentication</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_29" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_29" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[29]</a>In some circumstances requests or responses or
to both may require persistent authentication. That is a message sent by A
and authenticated by B may be subject to forwarding and authentication by C.
In addition some applications may require further measures to ensure that
messages meet certain legal standards to prevent repudiation.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_30" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_30" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[30]</a>An XKMS service MAY support Persistent
Authentication by means of a digital signature on the message.</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_5" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_5" shape="rect">2.5</a> <a name="MessageCorrelation" id="MessageCorrelation" shape="rect">Message Correlation</a>
(Response Replay and Request Substitution)</h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_31" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_31" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[31]</a>An XKMS service MUST support a means of
ensuring correct message correlation. That is the requestor must be assured
that the response returned was made in response to the intended request sent
to the service and not a modification of that request (Request Substitution
attack) or a response to an earlier request (response replay attack).</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_32" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_32" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[32]</a>In order to prevent response replay and request
message substitution attacks the requestor SHOULD ensure that the response
corresponds to the request. For correspondence verification to be possible
authentication of the response is required. In the TLS binding the
correspondence between the request and response is provided by the transport
layer. For message layer security mechanisms such as payload security the
mechanism required depends on whether or not the request is authenticated as
follows:</p>
<dl>
<dt>Authenticated Request</dt>
<dd>If the request and the response are authenticated the correspondence
of the request and response may be determined by verifying the value of
RequestId in the response.</dd>
<dt>Digest Authenticated Request</dt>
<dd>If the original request was authenticated by means of an XML
Signature with a message digest as the signing algorithm, the service
can still ensure a strong binding of the response to the original
request by means of the <RequestSignatureValue> element.</dd>
</dl>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_6" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_6" shape="rect">2.6</a> <a name="RequestReplay" id="RequestReplay" shape="rect">Request Replay</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_33" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_33" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[33]</a>An XKMS service may require protection against
a Request replay attack. In circumstances where no accounting or other
auditing is used to keep track of requests made, protection against a request
replay attack may not be required.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_34" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_34" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[34]</a>An XKMS service MAY provide protection against
a Request Replay.</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_7" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_7" shape="rect">2.7</a> <a name="DenialofService" id="DenialofService" shape="rect">Denial of Service</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_35" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_35" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[35]</a>An XKMS service may require protection against
a Denial of Service attack by means of protocol measures. Such measures may
not be required in circumstances where an XKMS service is protected against
Denial of Service by other means such as the service is managed on an
isolated, tightly controlled network and does not provide service outside
that network.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_36" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_36" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[36]</a>Denial of service attacks that originate from a
single identified source or set of sources may be addressed by applying
velocity controls. In cases where the source of the denial of service is
disguised lightweight authentication techniques such as the two-phase
protocol described bellow may be used to detect requests from forged
addresses.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_37" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_37" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[37]</a>An XKMS service SHOULD support protection
against a Denial of Service attack.</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_8" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_2_8" shape="rect">2.8</a> <a name="SecurityRequirementsSummary" id="SecurityRequirementsSummary" shape="rect">Security
Requirements Summary</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_38" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_38" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[38]</a>The following table summarizes the possible
security requirements that an XKMS service deployment may be subject to:</p>
<table border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<thead>
<tr>
<th width="30%" height="19" >Security Issue</th>
<th width="15%" >Requirement</th>
<th height="19" >Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="30%" height="72" >Confidentiality</td>
<td width="15%" valign="top" align="center" height="72" >Some</td>
<td valign="top" height="72" >The information provided by an XKMS
service may be confidential, the fact that a party has requested
particular information from an XKMS service may allow confidential
information to be deduced. Many XKMS applications do not require
confidentiality however.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="30%" height="54" >Request Authentication</td>
<td width="15%" valign="top" align="center" height="54" >Some</td>
<td valign="top" height="54" >A service only needs to authenticate a
request for information if either the information is confidential or
some form of charge is to be made for use of the service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="30%" height="36" >Response Authentication</td>
<td width="15%" valign="top" align="center" height="36" >Most</td>
<td valign="top" height="36" >An XKMS service that provides only a
Location service for self authenticating key information such as
Digital Certificates does not require authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="30%" height="54" >Persistent Authentication</td>
<td width="15%" valign="top" align="center" height="54" >Some</td>
<td valign="top" height="54" >Although some XKMS applications have a
specific requirement to support Non-Repudiation, the ability to
repudiate requests and responses is acceptable in many
applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="30%" height="54" >Message Correspondence</td>
<td width="15%" valign="top" align="center" height="54" >All</td>
<td valign="top" height="54" >The RequestId correspondence mechanism can
only be used if the Request Authentication mechanism can be relied
upon. Otherwise the Digest Mechanism should be used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="30%" height="36" >Request Replay</td>
<td width="15%" valign="top" align="center" height="36" >Some</td>
<td valign="top" height="36" >Request replay attacks are likely to only
be a concern if the service charges on a per request basis or as a
type of Denial of Service attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="30%" height="72" >Denial of Service</td>
<td width="15%" valign="top" align="center" height="72" >Most</td>
<td valign="top" height="72" >Any service made available on a public
network is likely to be subject to a Denial of Service attack. The
risk of a Denial of Service attack is generally considered to be
reduced on closed networks such as internal enterprise networks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_39" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_39" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[39]</a>Where the security requirements of the XKRSS
protocol differ from those of XKISS they are addressed by the XKRSS protocol
directly rather than relying upon the message security binding.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_40" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_40" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[40]</a>For example the XKRSS registration functions
are designed to support use in modes in which a client registration request
is accepted by a Local Registration Authority and then forwarded to a Master
Registration Authority. In this mode it is essential that the proof of
possession of the private key being registered can be verified by both the
Local Registration Authority and the Master Registration Authority, even
though the authentication for the request sent to the Master Registration
Authority is likely to be provided by the Local Registration Authority,
rather than the original requestor. Similar considerations affect the
distribution of private keys..</p>
<table border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<thead>
<tr>
<th width="30%" height="19" >Security Issue</th>
<th width="15%" height="19" >Requirement</th>
<th height="19" >Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Confidentiality of Private Key</td>
<td width="15%" valign="top" align="center" >If Server Generated Key
pairs used</td>
<td valign="top" >If a Register service supports registration of server
generated key pairs or key recovery strong encryption of the private
key MUST be supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Registration Request Authentication</td>
<td width="15%" valign="top" align="center" >Some</td>
<td valign="top" >XKMS Registration services SHOULD support the
authentication of registration requests for initial registration of a
key binding. Registration requests for secondary registration of
previously issued credentials (i.e. a signed key binding or a digital
certificate) MAY be permitted without authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Registration Proof Of Possession</td>
<td width="15%" valign="top" align="center" >Some</td>
<td valign="top" >XKMS Registration services SHOULD support the
verification of Proof Of Possession in the initial registration of
client generated keys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Authentication by Revocation Code</td>
<td width="15%" valign="top" align="center" >Some</td>
<td valign="top" >The XKMS Revocation code is self authenticating.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h1><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_3" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_3" shape="rect">3</a> <a name="SOAPBinding" id="SOAPBinding" shape="rect">SOAP Binding</a></h1>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_41" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_41" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[41]</a>This section describes a mechanism for
communicating the XKMS messages defined in Part 1 of this specification using
the SOAP message protocol. XKMS implementers should support the SOAP message
protocol for interoperability. When doing do, they MUST use the binding
described herein. Bindings for both SOAP 1.2 [SOAP1.2-1][SOAP1.2-2] and SOAP
1.1 [SOAP] protocols are specified.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_42" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_42" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[42]</a>XKMS 2.0 implementations MUST support the use
of SOAP 1.2. For near term compatibility with existing tools and
infrastructure, SOAP 1.1 MAY be used</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_1" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_1" shape="rect">3.1</a> <a name="XKMSSOAPMessageBinding" id="XKMSSOAPMessageBinding" shape="rect">XKMS SOAP Message
Binding</a></h2>
<h3><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_1_1" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_1_1" shape="rect">3.1.1</a> <a name="SOAP12Binding" id="SOAP12Binding" shape="rect">SOAP 1.2 Binding</a></h3>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_43" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_43"
class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[43]</a>XKMS implementers shall use
SOAP document style request-response messaging with the XKMS messages
defined in Part 1 carried as literal Body element content. This is
equivalent to associating the Body content with a SOAP 1.2 <span
class="ID"><a
href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2003/REC-soap12-part1-20030624/#soapencattr">
env:encodingStyle</a></span> attribute that has the value <span
class="ID">http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope/encoding/none</span>.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_44" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_44" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[44]</a>The XKMS binding shall use the SOAP
Request-Response Message Exchange Pattern defined in [SOAP1.2-2] and message
processing shall conform to that model. SOAP 1.2 messages carrying XKMS
content shall use the UTF-8 character encoding to insure
interoperability..</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_45" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_45" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[45]</a>SOAP 1.2 messages carrying XKMS content shall
conform to the following structure:</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_46" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_46" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[46]</a>XKMS Request Message</p>
<pre class="Example" xml:space="preserve"><?xml version='1.0' encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope">
<env:Body>
XKMS Request Message element
</env:Body>
</env:Envelope></pre>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_47" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_47" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[47]</a>XKMS Response Message</p>
<pre class="Example" xml:space="preserve"><?xml version='1.0' encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope">
<env:Body>
XKMS Response Message element
</env:Body>
</env:Envelope></pre>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_48" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_48" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[48]</a>The XKMS SOAP message binding does not require
use of SOAP Headers. Headers may be used with SOAP messages carrying XKMS
content to provide additional services such as communications security or
routing. The use of such Headers is beyond the scope of this specification.
If used however, they must not alter the message encoding style or SOAP
processing model specified herein.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_49" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_49" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[49]</a>Sample XKMS LocateRequest and LocateResponse
message communicated using SOAP 1.2 message transport are shown below:</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_50" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_50" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[50]</a>LocateRequest Message</p>
<!-- Include file -->
<pre class="Example" xml:space="preserve">
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope">
<env:Body>
<LocateRequest xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
Id="I8fc9f97052a34073312b22a69b3843b6"
Service="http://www.example.org/XKMS"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#">
<RespondWith>http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#KeyName</RespondWith>
<RespondWith>http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#KeyValue</RespondWith>
<RespondWith>http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#X509Cert</RespondWith>
<RespondWith>http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#X509Chain</RespondWith>
<RespondWith>http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#PGPWeb</RespondWith>
<RespondWith>http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#PGP</RespondWith>
<QueryKeyBinding>
<KeyUsage>http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#Encryption</KeyUsage>
<UseKeyWith Application="urn:ietf:rfc:2440"
Identifier="bob@example.com" />
<UseKeyWith Application="urn:ietf:rfc:2633"
Identifier="bob@example.com" />
</QueryKeyBinding>
</LocateRequest>
</env:Body>
</env:Envelope></pre>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_51" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_51" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[51]</a>LocateResponse Message</p>
<!-- Include file -->
<pre class="Example" xml:space="preserve">
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope">
<env:Body>
<LocateResult xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
Id="I8ce3809ab23500015cc27704b7eb0912"
Service="http://www.example.org/XKMS"
ResultMajor="http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#Success"
RequestId="I8fc9f97052a34073312b22a69b3843b6"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#">
<UnverifiedKeyBinding Id="I809ca03cf85b3cb466859694dbd0627d">
<ds:KeyInfo>
<ds:KeyValue>
<ds:RSAKeyValue>
<ds:Modulus>
3FFtWUsvEajQt2SeSF+RvAxWdPPh5GSlQnp8SDvvqvCwE6PXcRWrIGmV7twNf2T
UXCxYuztUUClMIy14B0Q+k1ej2nekmYL7+Ic3DDGVFVaYPoxaRY0Y2lV8tOreyn
WegpFbITXc8V6Y02QfR5O7Pn1/10ElslaF/TF8MQGqYE8=
</ds:Modulus>
<ds:Exponent>AQAB</ds:Exponent>
</ds:RSAKeyValue>
</ds:KeyValue>
<ds:X509Data>
<ds:X509Certificate>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</ds:X509Certificate>
<ds:X509Certificate>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</ds:X509Certificate>
</ds:X509Data>
</ds:KeyInfo>
<KeyUsage>http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#Signature</KeyUsage>
<KeyUsage>http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#Encryption</KeyUsage>
<KeyUsage>http://www.w3.org/2002/03/xkms#Exchange</KeyUsage>
<UseKeyWith Application="urn:ietf:rfc:2633"
Identifier="bob@example.com"/>
</UnverifiedKeyBinding>
</LocateResult>
</env:Body>
</env:Envelope></pre>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_52" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_52" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[52]</a>The structure of conformant SOAP 1.2 messages
carrying other XKMS message types should be evident based on this example.</p>
<h3><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_1_2" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_1_2" shape="rect">3.1.2</a> <a name="SOAP11Binding" id="SOAP11Binding" shape="rect">SOAP 1.1 Binding</a></h3>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_53" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_53" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[53]</a>XKMS implementers using SOAP 1.1 messaging
shall use request-response messaging and carry the XKMS messages as literal
content within the SOAP Body element. The SOAP 1.1 Section 5 encoding model
shall not be used. SOAP 1.1 messages carrying XKMS content shall use the
UTF-8 character encoding to insure interoperability.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_54" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_54" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[54]</a>The structure of XKMS SOAP 1.1 messages shall
conform to:</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_55" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_55" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[55]</a>XKMS Request Message</p>
<pre class="Example" xml:space="preserve"><?xml version='1.0' encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<env:Body>
XKMS Request Message element
</env:Body>
</env:Envelope></pre>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_56" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_56" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[56]</a>XKMS Response Message</p>
<pre class="Example" xml:space="preserve"><?xml version='1.0' encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<env:Body>
XKMS Response Message element
</env:Body>
</env:Envelope></pre>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_57" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_57" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[57]</a>As with the SOAP 1.2 binding, the SOAP 1.1
binding does not require use of SOAP Headers. Headers may be used with SOAP
messages carrying XKMS content to provide additional services such as
communications security or routing providing they don't impact the encoding
style or SOAP processing model specified herein.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_58" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_58" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[58]</a>SOAP 1.1 messages carrying XKMS content will
are identical to those using SOAP 1.2 except for the namespace of the
Envelope and Body elements. Hence, the examples shown in Section 3.1.1 are
conformant once the SOAP 1.2 namespace is replaced by the SOAP 1.1 namespace
(<a href="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" shape="rect">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/</a>).</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_2" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_2" shape="rect">3.2</a> <a name="Namespaceinclusions" id="Namespaceinclusions" shape="rect">Namespace
inclusions</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_59" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_59" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[59]</a>In using the XKMS SOAP binding, XKMS messages
are constructed as defined in Part 1 of this specification including all
required namespace declarations. The top-level message element is then
inserted as a child of the SOAP Body element. Promotion of XKMS namespace
declarations to the parent SOAP Body (or grandparent Envelope) element is not
required, but may be done at the discretion of the implementer. Such
namespace promotion is generally undesirable if the XKMS message contains a
digital signature as it may impact subsequent verification.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_60" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_60" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[60]</a>XKMS messages that will be embedded in SOAP documents SHOULD be
signed using the Exclusive XML Canonicalization algorithm [<a href="#XML-EXC-C14N" shape="rect">XML-EXC-C14N</a>].</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_3" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_3" shape="rect">3.3</a> <a name="ComputationofXMLSignatureElements" id="ComputationofXMLSignatureElements" shape="rect">Computation of XML Signature
Elements</a> in XKMS Messages</h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_61" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_61" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[61]</a>Use of the XKMS SOAP binding does not affect
processing of the XML Signature-based elements <span class="ID"><KeyBindingAuthentication></span> and <span class="ID"><ProofOfPossession></span>. These are computed as described
in XKMS, sections <a href="/TR/2005/REC-xkms2-20050628/#XKMS_2_0_Section_7_1_4" shape="rect">7.1.4</a> and <a href="/TR/2005/REC-xkms2-20050628/#XKMS_2_0_Section_7_1_6" shape="rect">7.1.6</a>
respectively, and the signature validation processing described in XKMS,
section <a href="/TR/2005/REC-xkms2-20050628/#XKMS_2_0_Section_3_1_2" shape="rect">3.1.2</a> Element
<span class="ID"><ds:Signature></span>." That is, the SOAP defined
nodes and namespaces do not contribute to the Signature computation.</p>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_4" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_4" shape="rect">3.4</a> <a name="UseofSOAPFaults" id="UseofSOAPFaults" shape="rect">Use of SOAP Faults</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_62" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_62" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[62]</a>SOAP Faults shall be used by an XKMS service to
communicate errors that prevent the processing of a received XKMS request
message. XKMS clients should never send a SOAP Fault message to an XKMS
service.</p>
<h3><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_4_1" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_4_1" shape="rect">3.4.1</a> <a name="SOAP12Faults" id="SOAP12Faults" shape="rect">SOAP 1.2 Faults</a></h3>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_63" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_63" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[63]</a>The following SOAP Fault messages are defined
for use with the XKMS SOAP 1.2 binding. Consistent with the SOAP 1.2
specification, these Fault messages shall contain the mandatory Code and
Reason element information items. Inclusion of other elements is at the
discretion of the implementer.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_64" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_64" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[64]</a>In response to an XKMS request message, the
receiver shall respond with one of the following SOAP Faults if it is unable
to process the message. If it is able to process the message, then the
response should conform to a valid XKMS response message as described in Part
1.</p>
<ol>
<li>A fault with a Value of "env:VersionMismatch" for Code shall be
returned when the XKMS service finds an invalid element information item
instead of the expected Envelope element information item, or the
namespace, local name or both did not match the required Envelope element
information item. The Reason element shall be "Unsupported SOAP
version".</li>
<li>A fault with a Value of "env:MustUnderstand" for Code shall be returned
if there is an immediate child element information item of the SOAP
Header element information item that was either not understood or not
obeyed by the faulting node when the Header contained a SOAP
mustUnderstand attribute information item with a value of "true". The
value for Reason shall be "Unable to process [header element name]" where
the expression in brackets is replaced by the header element information
item which caused the initial fault.</li>
<li>A fault with a Value of "env:Receiver" for Code shall be generated when
the receiver cannot handle the message because of some temporary
condition, e.g. when it is out of memory. The Reason shall be "Service
temporarily unable".</li>
<li>A fault with a Value of "env:Sender" for Code and a Value of
"xkms:MessageNotSupported" for Subcode shall be generated when the
receiver does not support the type of request message. The Reason shall
be "[XKMS message type] not supported" where the expression in brackets
is replace by the element information item name corresponding to the
received XKMS request message.</li>
<li>A fault with a Value of "env:Sender" for Code and a Value of
"xkms:BadMessage" for Subcode shall be generated when the receiver cannot
parse the received XKMS message. The Reason shall be "[XKMS message type]
invalid" where the expression in brackets is replaced by the element
information item name corresponding to the received XKMS request
message.</li>
</ol>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_65" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_65" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[65]</a>A sample SOAP 1.2 fault message that would be
returned when the received XKMS request message isn't supported by the
service is shown below:</p>
<!-- Include file -->
<pre class="Example" xml:space="preserve"><?xml version="1.0" ?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope">
<env:Body>
<env:Fault>
<env:Code>
<env:Value>env:Sender</env:Value>
<env:Subcode>
<env:Value>xkms:MessageNotSupported</env:Value>
</env:Subcode>
</env:Code>
<env:Reason>LocateRequest message not supported</env:Reason>
</env:Fault>
</env:Body>
</env:Envelope></pre>
<h3><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_4_2" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_4_2" shape="rect">3.4.2</a> <a name="SOAP11Faults" id="SOAP11Faults" shape="rect">SOAP 1.1 Faults</a></h3>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_66" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_66" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[66]</a>The following SOAP Fault messages are defined
for use with the XKMS SOAP 1.1 binding. Consistent with the SOAP 1.1
specification, these Fault messages shall contain the faultcode and
faultstring elements. Inclusion of other elements is at the discretion of the
implementer.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_67" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_67" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[67]</a>In response to an XKMS request message, the
receiver shall respond with one of the following SOAP Faults if it is unable
to process the message. If it is able to process the message, then the
response should conform to a valid XKMS response message as described in
[XKMS1].</p>
<ol>
<li>A fault with a faultcode of "env:VersionMismatch" shall be returned
when the XKMS service doesn't find the expected Envelope element or the
namespace, local name or both did not match the required Envelope
element. The faultstring element shall contain "Unsupported SOAP
version".</li>
<li>A fault with a faultcode of "env:MustUnderstand" shall be returned if
there is an immediate child element of the SOAP Header element that was
either not understood or not obeyed by the faulting node when the header
contained a SOAP mustUnderstand attribute item with a value of
"1". The faultstring shall be "Unable to
process [header element name]" where the expression in brackets is
replaced by the first header element information item which caused the
fault.</li>
<li>A fault with a faultcode of "env:Server" shall be returned when the
service cannot handle the message because of some temporary condition,
e.g. when it is out of memory. The faultstring shall be "Service
temporarily unable".</li>
<li>A fault with a faultcode of "env:Client" shall be returned when the
receiver does not support the type of request message. The value for
faultstring shall be "[XKMS message type] not supported" where the
expression in brackets is replace by the element information item name
corresponding to the received XKMS request message.</li>
<li>A fault with a faultcode of "env:Client" shall be returned when the
receiver cannot parse the received XKMS message. The faultstring shall be
"[XKMS message type] invalid" where the expression in brackets is replace
by the element information item name corresponding to the received XKMS
request message.</li>
</ol>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_68" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_68" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[68]</a>A sample SOAP 1.1 fault message that would be
returned when the received XKMS request message isn't supported by the
service is shown below:</p>
<!-- Include file -->
<pre class="Example" xml:space="preserve"><?xml version="1.0" ?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<env:Body>
<env:Fault>
<env:faultcode>env:Client</env:faultcode>
<env:faultstring>LocateRequest message not supported</env:faultstring>
</env:Fault>
</env:Body>
</env:Envelope></pre>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_5" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_3_5" shape="rect">3.5</a> <a name="SOAPoverHTTPbinding" id="SOAPoverHTTPbinding" shape="rect">SOAP over HTTP
binding</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_69" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_69" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[69]</a>When the XKMS binding to SOAP 1.2 is
implemented, the SOAP messages should be sent using HTTP POST consistent with
the recommendations of Section 6.4.2 in [SOAP1.2-2]. Processing shall be
consistent with Section 7, SOAP HTTP Binding in that specification.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_70" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_70" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[70]</a>When the XKMS binding to SOAP 1.1 is
implemented, the SOAP messages should be sent using HTTP POST consistent with
the of Section 6.1 in [SOAP].</p>
<h1><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_4" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_4" shape="rect">4</a> <a name="SecurityBindings" id="SecurityBindings" shape="rect">Security Bindings</a></h1>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_71" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_71" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[71]</a>This specification describes two principal
security bindings each of which specifies two or more specific implementation
profiles.</p>
<table border="1" width="100%" id="AutoNumber1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="4">
<thead>
<tr>
<th align="center" >Feature</th>
<th width="30%" >Payload Security</th>
<th width="30%" >Transaction Layer Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top" >Dependencies</td>
<td width="30%" valign="top" >Authentication defined by XKMS
specification, client does not need to implement a comprehensive
framework</td>
<td width="30%" valign="top" >Authentication mechanism defined by TLS
which clients must implement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" >Use of XML Signature</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Uses XML Signature in Enveloped Mode
requiring slightly more complex processing</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Not required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" >Support for Routing</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Specification describes bi-lateral
authentication only, multi-hop message routing and multi-party
transactions are not supported</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" >Support for Confidentiality</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >None, although applications may employ TLS
to establish a secure channel</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" >Non-Repudiation</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Supported</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Requires additional payload security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" >Unspecified Party Authentication</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Supported</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Requires additional payload security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" >Client Authentication</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Supported</td>
<td valign="top" width="30%" >Supported through certificate client
authentication or through use of payload security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_4_1" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_4_1" shape="rect">4.1</a> <a name="PayloadAuthenticationBinding" id="PayloadAuthenticationBinding" shape="rect">Payload
Authentication Binding</a></h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_71a" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_71a" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[71a]</a></p>
<dl>
<dt>Client Authentication Modes:</dt>
<dd>No mechanism is used to authenticate the client</dd>
<dd>The client is authenticated using payload security</dd>
</dl>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_71b" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_71b" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[71b]</a>In the following table, Request/Signature means that a XKMS Request
element includes a <code><dsig:Signature></code> element in enveloped
mode. This signature is calculated using a digital signature method.
Request/MAC has similar meaning, except that the signature is calculated
using a Message Authentication Code (MAC).</p>
<table border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" width="100%" id="AutoNumber8">
<thead>
<tr>
<th width="45%" >Security Consideration</th>
<th width="5%" >Client Authentication
Mode</th>
<th width="15%" >Support</th>
<th >Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<th width="45%" align="left" rowspan="2"><span style="font-weight: 400">Client
Authentication Mechanism</span></th>
<td width="5%" align="left" valign="top" >No
authentication mechanism is used.</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >None</td>
<td > </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="5%" align="left" valign="top" >Authentication using payload
security</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >Payload</td>
<td >Request/Signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th width="45%" align="left" ><span style="font-weight: 400">Service
Authentication Mechanism</span></th>
<td width="5%" align="left" valign="top" > Not
Applicable</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >Payload</td>
<td >Response/Signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th width="45%" align="left" ><span style="font-weight: 400">Request/Response
Correspondence</span></th>
<td width="5%" align="left" valign="top" >Authentication using payload
security</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >Payload</td>
<td >Message/RequestId</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th width="45%" align="left" ><span style="font-weight: 400">Replay
Attack Protection</span></th>
<td width="5%" align="left" valign="top" >Any</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >Payload</td>
<td >Message/Nonce in Two-phase protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th width="45%" align="left" ><span style="font-weight: 400">Denial Of
Service Protection</span></th>
<td width="5%" align="left" valign="top" >Any</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >Payload</td>
<td ><span class="c11">Request/RespondWith=Represent</span></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th width="45%" align="left" ><span style="font-weight: 400">Non
Repudiation</span></th>
<td width="5%" align="left" valign="top" >Any</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >Payload</td>
<td >Message/Signature with digital signature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p></p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_72" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_72" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[72]</a> The following payload security features are
employed:</p>
<table border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" width="100%" id="AutoNumber9">
<thead>
<tr>
<th width="50%" >XKMS element.attribute name</th>
<th width="50%" >Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" >MessageAbstractType.Service</td>
<td width="50%" >Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" >MessageAbstractType.Signature</td>
<td width="50%" >Required in profile where client is
authenticated using payload security for both Request and Response
Messages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" >ResultType.RequestId</td>
<td width="50%" >Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" >PendingRequestType.ResponseId</td>
<td width="50%" >Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" >MessageAbstractType.Nonce</td>
<td width="50%" >Optional, may be used to protect against Denial of
Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" ><span class="c11">MessageAbstractType.RespondWith=Represent</span></td>
<td width="50%" >Optional, may be used to protect against Denial of
Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" >Request.Signature
with MAC</td>
<td width="50%" >Required in profile where no
mechanism is used to authenticate the client, Optional in
profile where client is authenticated using
payload security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_4_2" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_4_2" shape="rect">4.2</a> <a name="SecureSocketLayerandTransactionLayer" id="SecureSocketLayerandTransactionLayer" shape="rect">Secure Socket Layer and Transaction
Layer</a> (SSL/TLS)Security Binding</h2>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_73" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_73" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[73]</a>When TLS is to be used in XKMS, XKMS responders
MUST support server authenticated TLS. Note that this means that an XKMS
client need only support anonymous TLS, since to require otherwise would mean
that all XKMS clients would have to be able to store root certificates for
TLS usage.<br clear="none" />
<br clear="none" />
All XKMS clients and responders which support TLS MUST support the
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES-EDE_CBC_SHA ciphersuite.<br clear="none" />
Other ciphersuites MAY be supported, but weak ciphersuites intended to meet
export restrictions ("export grade") are NOT RECOMMENDED to be supported."</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_74" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_74" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[74]</a>The SSL/TLS binding has three client authentication
modes:</p>
<dl>
<dt>SSL/TLS Client Authentication Modes:</dt>
<dd>No mechanism is used to authenticate the client</dd>
<dd>TLS certificate based client authentication is used to authenticate
the client</dd>
<dd>Payload security is used for client authentication</dd>
</dl>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_74a" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_74a" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[74a]</a></p>
<table border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" width="100%" id="AutoNumber6">
<thead>
<tr>
<th width="25%" >Security Consideration</th>
<th width="15%" >Client
Authentication Mode</th>
<th width="15%" >Support</th>
<th >Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="25%" align="left" rowspan="3" >Client Authentication Mechanism</td>
<td width="15%" >No authentication mechanism is used
</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >None</td>
<td width="45%" > </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="15%" >TLS certificate based client
authentication is used.</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >TLS</td>
<td width="45%" >Certificate based client authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="15%" >Authentication using Payload
security</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >Payload</td>
<td width="45%" >Request/Signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="25%" align="left" >Service Authentication Mechanism</td>
<td width="15%" >Not applicable</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >TLS</td>
<td width="45%" > </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="25%" align="left" >Request/Response Correspondence</td>
<td width="15%" >Any</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >TLS</td>
<td width="45%" >Message/RequestId</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="25%" align="left" >Replay Attack Protection</td>
<td width="15%" >Any</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >TLS</td>
<td width="45%" >Message/Nonce in Two-phase protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="25%" align="left" >Denial Of Service Protection</td>
<td width="15%" >Any</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >None</td>
<td width="45%" >TLS has no specific countermeasures against denial of service
attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="25%" align="left" >Non Repudiation</td>
<td width="15%" >Any</td>
<td width="15%" align="center" >Payload</td>
<td width="45%" >Message/Signature with digital signature [if
required]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p></p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_75" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_75" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[75]</a> The following payload security features are
employed:</p>
<table border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" width="100%" id="AutoNumber7">
<thead>
<tr>
<th width="50%" >XKMS element.attribute name</th>
<th width="50%" >Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" >MessageAbstractType.Service</td>
<td width="50%" >Required, but not dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" >MessageAbstractType.Signature</td>
<td width="50%" >Optional, may be used to support non-repudiation for
both Request and Response messages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" >ResultType.RequestId</td>
<td width="50%" >Required, but not dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" >PendingRequestType.ResponseId</td>
<td width="50%" >Required, but not dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" >MessageAbstractType.Nonce</td>
<td width="50%" >Unnecessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="50%" align="left" ><span class="c11">MessageAbstractType.RespondWith=Represent</span></td>
<td width="50%" >Unnecessary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h1 class="appendix"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_A" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_A" shape="rect">Appendix A</a> <a name="References" id="References" shape="rect">References (Non-Normative)</a></h1>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_76" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_76" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[76]</a> <b><a name="ref-KEYWORDS" id="ref-KEYWORDS" shape="rect">[RFC2119]</a></b> S. Bradner, <i>Key words for use in RFCs
to Indicate Requirement Levels</i>, IETF RFC 2119, March 1997. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt" shape="rect">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt</a>.</p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_77" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_77" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[77]</a> <b><a id="TLS" name="TLS" shape="rect">[RFC2246]</a></b> T.
Dierks, C. Allen., <i>The TLS Protocol Version, 1.0.</i> IETF RFC 2246
January 1999. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt" shape="rect">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt</a></p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_78" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_78" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[78]</a> <b><a name="RFC2693" id="RFC2693" shape="rect">[RFC2693]</a></b> C. Ellison et. al., Simple Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Theory, IETF RFC 2693, Sept. 1999. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2693.txt" shape="rect">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2693.txt</a> </p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_79" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_79" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[79]</a> <b>[<a name="RFC3280" id="RFC3280" shape="rect">RFC3280</a>]</b> R. Housley et. al., Public Key Infrastructure
(X.509) (PKIX) Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile,
IETF RFC 3280, April 2002 ,<a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280.txt" shape="rect">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280.txt</a> </p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_80" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_80" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[80]</a> <b>[<a id="SOAP" name="SOAP" shape="rect">SOAP</a>]</b> D.
Box, D Ehnebuske, G. Kakivaya, A. Layman, N. Mendelsohn, H. Frystyk Nielsen,
S Thatte, D. Winer. <i>Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 1.1</i>, W3C Note
08 May 2000. <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/NOTE-SOAP-20000508/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/NOTE-SOAP-20000508/</a></p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_81" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_81" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[81]</a> <b><a id="XMLP-1" name="XMLP-1" shape="rect">[SOAP1.2-1]</a></b> M. Gudgin, et al. <i>SOAP Version 1.2
Part 1: Messaging Framework</i>, W3C Recommendation 24 June 2003. <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2003/REC-soap12-part1-20030624/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/2003/REC-soap12-part1-20030624/</a></p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_82" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_82" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[82]</a> <b><a id="XMLP-2" name="XMLP-2" shape="rect">[SOAP1.2-2]</a></b> M. Gudgin, et al. <i>SOAP Version 1.2
Part 2: Adjuncts</i>, W3C Recommendation 24 June 2003. <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2003/REC-soap12-part2-20030624/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/2003/REC-soap12-part2-20030624/</a></p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_85" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_85" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[85]</a> <b>[<a id="XML-SIG" name="XML-SIG" shape="rect">XML-SIG</a>]</b> D. Eastlake, J. R., D. Solo, M. Bartel,
J. Boyer , B. Fox , E. Simon. <i>XML-Signature Syntax and Processing</i>,
W3C Recommendation. <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/</a></p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_86" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_86" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[86]</a> <b>[<a id="XML-SIG-XSD" name="XML-SIG-XSD" shape="rect">XML-SIG-XSD</a>]</b> XML Signature Schema available from
<a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/xmldsig-core-schema.xsd" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/xmldsig-core-schema.xsd</a></p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_86a" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_86a" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[86a]</a> <b>[<a id="XML-EXC-C14N" name="XML-EXC-C14N" shape="rect">XML-EXC-C14N</a>]</b> J. Boyer, D. E. Eastlake, J. Reagle. <em>Exclusive XML Canonicalization</em>. W3C Recommendation 8 July 2002.
<a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xml-exc-c14n-20020718/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xml-exc-c14n-20020718/</a></p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_87" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_87" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[87]</a> <b>[<a id="XML-Enc" name="XML-Enc" shape="rect">XML-Enc</a>]</b> D. Eastlake, J. Reagle, T. Imamura, B. Dillaway, E. Simon, <i>XML Encryption Syntax and
Processing</i>, W3C Recommendation 10 December 2002. <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210/</a></p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_88" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_88" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[88]</a> <b>[<a id="ref-XML-NS" name="ref-XML-NS" shape="rect">XML-NS</a>]</b> T. Bray, D. Hollander, A. Layman.
<i>Namespaces in XML. W3C Recommendation.</i> January 1999. <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xml-names-19990114/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xml-names-19990114</a></p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_89" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_89" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[89]</a> <b>[<a id="XML-Schema1" name="XML-Schema1" shape="rect">XML-Schema1</a>]</b> H. S. Thompson, D. Beech, M. Maloney,
N. Mendelsohn. <i>XML Schema Part 1: Structures Second Edition</i>, W3C Recommendation 28 October 2004. <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema-1/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema-1/</a></p>
<p class="Ref"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_90" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_90" class="markParagraph" shape="rect">[90]</a> <b>[<a id="XML-Schema2" name="XML-Schema2" shape="rect">XML-Schema2</a>]</b> P. V. Biron, A. Malhotra, <i>XML
Schema Part 2: Datatypes Second Edition</i>; W3C Recommendation 28 October 2004. <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema-2/" shape="rect">http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema-2/</a></p>
<h1 class="appendix"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_B" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_B" shape="rect">Appendix B</a> <a name="Acknowledgments" id="Acknowledgments" shape="rect">Acknowledgments (Non-Normative)</a></h1>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_91" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_91" class="markParagraph"
shape="rect">[91]</a>This specification is the work of the W3C XML Key Management
Working Group. The contributions of the following Working Group
members to this specification are gratefully acknowledged in
accordance with the <a
href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS/Contributor.html"
shape="rect">contributor policies</a> and the active <a
href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS/Participants.html" shape="rect">WG
roster</a>.</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_92" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_92" class="markParagraph"
shape="rect">[92]</a>Participants in the Working Group are (at the time of writing, and
by alphabetical order): Guillermo Alvaro Rey (Trinity College
Dublin), Stephen Farrell (Trinity College Dublin, Co-Chair),
José Kahan (W3C, staff contact), Berin Lautenbach (Apache
Software Foundation), Tommy Lindberg (Markup Security), Roland
Lockhart (Entrust, Inc.), Vamsi Motukuru (Oracle Corp.), Shivaram
Mysore (Co-Chair; Editor since 13 Apr 2004), Rich Salz (DataPower
Technology, Inc.), Yunhao Zhang (SQLData Systems).</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_93" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_93" class="markParagraph"
shape="rect">[93]</a>Previous participants
were (by alphabetical order): Daniel Ash (Identrus),
Blair Dillaway (Microsoft), Donald
Eastlake 3rd (Motorola), Yassir Elley (Sun Microsystems), Jeremy Epstein (webMethods),
Slava Galperin (Sun Microsystems), Phillip Hallam-Baker (VeriSign Inc, Editor until 13 Apr 2004),
Loren Hart (VeriSign Inc.), Mack Hicks (Bank of America), Merlin Hughes (Baltimore),
Frederick Hirsch (Nokia Mobile Phones), Mike Just (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat),
Brian LaMacchia (Microsoft), Pradeep Lamsal,
Joseph Reagle (W3C, previous staff contact), Dave Remy (GeoTrust, Inc.), Peter
Rostin (RSA Security Inc.), Ed Simon (XMLsec Inc.)</p>
<p><a name="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_94" id="XKMS_2_0_Paragraph_94" class="markParagraph"
shape="rect">[94]</a>The authors also acknowledge
the extensive assistance provided in
the design stage of this specification by David Solo (CitiGroup) and
Barbara Fox (Microsoft), and the contributions of (by alphabetical
order) Dr. Paul Boisen (NSA), Alex Deacon, Dan Guinan, Marc Hayes,
Jeremy Epstein (webMethods), Andrew Layman (Microsoft), Mingliang Pei
(VeriSign).</p>
<h1 class="appendix"><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_C" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_C" shape="rect">Appendix C Changes (Non-Normative)</a></h1>
<p>This appendix documents changes (other than very minor editorial
changes) from the <a
href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2005/PR-xkms2-bindings-20050502/">Proposed
Recommendation of 2 May 2005</a> that were made to accommodate the <a
href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS/Drafts/pr-issues/issues.html">comments</a>. Each
entry contains:</p>
<ul>
<li>a change number</li>
<li>a brief description and, where appropriate, what has been done about
it</li>
<li>a link to the message causing the change (if the message is public)</li>
</ul>
<h2><a name="XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_C_1" id="XKMS_2_0_Section_Appendix_C_1" shape="rect">Changes in the XKMS Bindings Specification between PR and Recommendation</a></h2>
<ol>
<li>
Change. The text in p. [60] was confusing on how to avoid
namespace prefix collisions when embedding XKMS messages in SOAP
documents. This was changed to say that the XKMS messages SHOULD
be signed using exc-c14n, and which was already suggested by
pp. [89] and [90] of the XKMS specification.
(<a
href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS/Drafts/pr-issues/issues.html#345-ml"
shape="rect">345-ml</a>)
</li>
<li>
Correction. pp. 46, 47, 55, 56 of Part 2 incorrectly indicated that the SOAP
Body resides inside the SOAP Header. (<a
href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS/Drafts/pr-issues/issues.html#338-tl-1"
shape="rect">338-tl-1</a>)</li>
<li>
Correction. p. 47 had a redundant semicolon (;) at the end.
(<a
href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS/Drafts/pr-issues/issues.html#338-tl-2"
shape="rect">338-tl-2</a>)</li>
<li>
Correction. Clarified p. 43 to say that XKMS messages are carried in Soap 1.2
messages as literal Body element content. Removed the
rationale of why encoding was not selected as it had become irrelevant.
(<a
href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS/Drafts/pr-issues/issues.html#339-ml"
shape="rect">339-ml</a>)
</li>
<li>
Correction. Clarified p. 53 to say that XKMS messages are carriend in Soap 1.1
messages as literal Body element content.
(<a
href="http://www.w3.org/2001/XKMS/Drafts/pr-issues/issues.html#348-ml"
shape="rect">348-ml</a>)
</li>
</ol>
<p></p>
</body>
</html>